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Small firms encounter difficulties in raising external finance owing to greater information 
problems. For small innovative firms, whose activity is more difficult to evaluate, the cost of 
external finance could be even higher. This paper examines special features of the financial 
structure of small innovative firms, compared with firms of similar size that do not innovate. 
The evidence shows that small innovators rely less on financial debt and more on internal 
financial resources; no important differences appear for large firms. This is consistent with the 
view that informational problems mainly affect small firms; large firms, even when they 
innovate, continue to rely on their traditional set of financial instruments. Another finding is 
that in small innovative firms investment is less sensitive to cash flow than in small non-
innovative firms, probably because the high incidence of internal financial resources allows 
them more flexibility in deciding their investments. No comparable difference is found 
between innovative and non-innovative large firms.  
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  1.  Introduction
1 
Asymmetric information problems between firms and external financiers strongly affect 
their relationship and shape the nature of the contract between them, such as the choice of debt 
versus equity, and for debt, the presence of collateral, covenants and the maturity of the loan. 
Innovative firms are distinctively plagued by the problem of information opaqueness. Due to 
novelty and the higher return variability of their projects, external financiers may be less able 
to  evaluate  their  activity,  and  the  cost  of  external  finance  could  therefore  be  higher  for 
innovative firms. The asymmetric information problem is also emphasised as innovative firms 
frequently prefer to maintain secrecy about what they are doing to prevent other firms from 
using their ideas. As knowledge is non rival, when revealed it can be used by other firms 
(Arrow, 1962). Lenders know that it can be costly for innovative firms to reveal their projects 
to the market and this reduces the quality of the signal the firm tries to send to the external 
lender (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Anton and Yao, 2002).  
The  theoretical  literature  therefore  states  that  innovative  firms  should  find  it  more 
difficult to obtain external finance. Further, essentially due to moral hazard problems and the 
higher  risk  of  their  activity,  innovative  firms  should  rely  more  on  equity  than  on  debt. 
Empirical research has recently found that this is the case: Blass and Yosha (2003) and Aghion 
et al.(2004) show that large listed innovative companies, respectively in Israel and in the UK, 
are more likely to finance their activity by issuing shares. However, many firms involved in 
innovative activities are small firms (Acs and Audretsch, 1990). For small innovative firms, the 
typical asymmetric information problems of being a small company, a proxy for information 
opacity largely used in empirical research (Berger and Udell, 1998), compound with those of 
performing  innovations.  Small  innovative  firms,  which  are  generally  non publicly  traded, 
could  encounter  more  problems  in  raising  outside  equity,  specifically  in  financial  markets 
where venture capital is not well developed. It is therefore highly likely that small innovators 
rely much more on internally generated funds (Hall, 2002). However, on this specific point, i.e. 
the financing of small and innovative firms, the empirical evidence is scant, mainly owing to 
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the limitations of the available data. Most of the information concerning innovation is collected 
only for large and publicly traded firms. The few previous studies analysing this topic either 
deal with “small” firms that are publicly traded (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994) or that are 
actually quite large (Harhoff, 1998); moreover, they are more concerned with an analysis of 
investment sensitivity to cash flow rather than with studying differences in financial structures.  
The first contribution of this paper is precisely to analyse the financing of small and 
innovative firms in Italy to understand whether there are some specific features in this type of 
firm.  This  involves  combining  two  distinct  analyses  that  were  previously  implemented  in 
isolation. Because they are small, these firms should find it more difficult to collect external 
funds;  when  they  need  them,  due  to  their  information  problems,  bank  loans  are  the  most 
frequent choice (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Berger and Udell, 1998). However, because they are 
innovative, debt is not the most suitable form of financing and these firms would need more 
equity  rather  than  debt.  The  question  therefore  is:  “Do  financial  constraints  on  innovation 
depend on the firm’s size?” Italy is an interesting country for this analysis as it is rich in very 
small firms, bank loans are the prevailing form of external finance and venture capital is not 
very widespread. In this paper, a company is classified as small if it has a maximum of 20 
employees, the 1
st quartile of the size distribution in our initial sample of firms; Berger and 
Udell (1998) rely on the same threshold to define “smaller” companies in the US.  
A second contribution relates to the definition of innovative firms used in this paper. In 
empirical research, innovative firms are often identified either as carrying on some research 
and development (R&D) activity or as belonging to high tech industries. In this paper, we 
consider innovative those firms that declare they are innovative either in their process or in 
their product and that also have some revenues from selling new products; this information is 
available in the Survey of Manufacturing Firms (SMF). This indicator has been widely used in 
studies on the determinants of innovation (Mairesse and Mohen, 2002), but not in empirical 
research on the financing of innovative firms.
2 Compared with the identification based on R&D 
expenditure, this indicator identifies firms that have obtained an output from the innovation 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
author and do not involve the responsibility of the Bank of Italy. Any errors or omissions are my own.  
2 A recent study on German firms (von Kalckreuth, 2004) uses a similar indicator based on a survey where the 
firms were asked whether they introduce new products on the market and whether the innovation is a fundamental 
innovation for the level of technology.      5 
black box and have not just put in an input; therefore, these firms have somehow succeeded in 
their innovation activity. The identification based on high tech industries has the drawback that 
not all the firms in these industries are truly innovators. 
As  a  preview  of  the  results,  small  innovative  firms  have  lower  leverage  than  non  
innovative firms of similar size. They also try to rely more on equity: when they issue new 
equities,  the  incidence  with  respect  to  total  sources  is  higher  compared  with  small  non 
innovative firms. However, they face more problems in raising outside equity: they are less 
likely to issue new equities compared with large innovative firms. As a consequence, small 
innovative firms rely strongly on an increase in their cash flow on total sources to finance their 
activity compared with non innovative firms of similar size. Less important differences appear 
in the group of large firms when comparing innovators and non innovators: overall, they seem 
to use a similar set of financial instruments. Finally, we consider the impact of these different 
financial structures on firms’ investment policy by analysing their sensitivity to cash flow. As 
in  Bond  et  al  (2003b),  who  study  a  sample  of  UK  and  German  firms,  innovative  firms 
unexpectedly have lower investment sensitivity to cash flow. Interestingly, we are able to elicit 
that the reduction in this sensitivity, at least in the case of Italy, is entirely explained by small 
innovative firms compared with non innovative firms of the same size. In the group of large 
firms no statistical significant difference arises. Bond et al (2003b) explain their result by 
arguing that innovative firms do not apparently face financial constraints as they are “deep 
pocket”  firms,  i.e.  they  engage  in  innovation  activity  when  they  have  plenty  of  internal 
financial resources to do so. This is certainly the case for small innovative firms in Italy. They 
are able to finance their investments because they have plenty of cash flow. It is not entirely 
clear  whether  it  is  reasonable  to  argue  that  these  firms  do  not  really  face  any  financial 
constraints.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework and the 
empirical  literature.  Section  3  focuses  on  the  data  used.  Section  4  analyses  the  financial 
structures in detail in order to identify any significant difference between innovative and non  
innovative firms, in particular according to the firm size. Section 5 contains the results of the 
estimations of investment sensitivity to cash flow, while Section 6 includes some extensions 
and sensitivity analysis. Section 7 discusses the results and concludes.    6 
2.  Theoretical framework and previous empirical evidence 
A strand of the theoretical literature on innovation has focused on the appropriability 
problems  that  this  activity  entails.  Knowledge  is  embodied  in  the  human  capital  of  the 
researcher, who can easily walk away. Further, the allocation of property rights over the output 
of innovation is not a feasible solution as knowledge is not verifiable. This influences the way 
the research can be conducted, either in corporations or through a venture capitalist directly 
financing  the  researcher  (Anand  and  Galetovic,  2000;  Aghion  and  Tirole,  1994).  In  these 
studies, the financial sector is typically very stylised. Another strand of the literature has tried 
to characterise more accurately the optimal capital structure for firms that are perceived to be 
riskier, such as innovative firms. As mentioned earlier, it is widely acknowledged that, due to 
greater asymmetric information problems between firms  and outside financiers, one of the 
major financial sources for innovative firms is internal finance (Hall, 2002). This idea can be 
traced back to Schumpeter (1942), who argued that firms with monopoly power, which can 
rely more on profits as a source of finance, are more likely to innovate.
3 When innovators need 
to use external finance, it has been argued, on the basis of the pecking order theory (Myers and 
Majluf,  1984),  that  debt  should  be  preferred  to  new  equity.  As  asymmetric  information 
problems are at the heart of innovative activity, especially for small innovators, new equity 
could turn out to be a very expensive source of finance.  
Nonetheless, more recent approaches emphasise the importance of equity, compared with 
debt, as an external source of finance for innovative firms. First, there are agency problems. 
Debt  increases  moral  hazard  problems:  firms  can  substitute  high risk  projects  for  low risk 
investments  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976);  high risk  projects  increase  the  probability  of 
bankruptcy, but offer no offsetting gain to debt holders if success is achieved. This problem 
could be particularly serious for innovative firms, whose managers have more opportunities to 
substitute high risk projects for low risk investments. Hence, moral hazard problems are likely 
to increase quickly with leverage (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). Second, it has been stressed 
that upside returns are not bounded for investors who buy equity. On the contrary, debt holders 
do not share in firms’ returns in a good state of nature; hence they are only concerned with the 
bottom part of the tail of the distribution of returns (Stiglitz, 1985). Third, according to the    7 
bankruptcy costs theory, the marginal cost of financial debt could increase very quickly for 
innovative firms because fewer tangible assets can be used to secure loans (Carpenter and 
Petersen,  2002b);  this  is  particularly  true  for  small  innovative  companies  with  few  assets 
already in place. Unlike debt, equity finance does not increase the probability of bankruptcy. 
Another approach is based on control rights (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Aghion et al. 2004). 
The lower the amount of tangible wealth, the more outside investors want to have control rights 
over the firm’s decisions to satisfy their ex ante participation constraint. Firms will try to use 
retained earnings first to alleviate the participation constraint of outside financiers. When more 
funds are required, firms will initially use debt to retain some control, which they lose only in 
the case of default. Only when the size of the project becomes sufficiently large or when assets 
are increasingly intangible, will firms give more control rights to outside investors by issuing 
new equity. As innovative firms have more investment opportunities and intangible assets, they 
are more likely to issue new equity. Finally, it is also worth mentioning the results obtained by 
Bolton and Freixas (2000): in their model, the riskiest firms do not obtain bank loans, but issue 
new equity; these firms would like to rely on debt financing, following the pecking order 
theory in Myers and Majluf (1984), but they are too risky to obtain bank loans or issue bonds; 
the only option available is equity financing, even if the costs are high.  
On  the  empirical  side,  there  is  an  increasing  evidence  confirming  the  theoretical 
prediction that innovative firms rely more on internal finance (Hall, 2002) and less on leverage 
(Bradley, Jarrel and Kim 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988). It also seems clear that outside 
equity is a valuable source of funds for innovative firms, at least in some countries. Carpenter 
and Petersen (2002a), using a panel of publicly traded US high tech companies, find that most 
small firms obtain little debt financing. On the contrary, new equity is very important and 
allows  a  large  increase  in  firm  size;  they  argue  that  small  companies  may  face  financing 
constraints  on  investments  that  could  be  relaxed  by  new  equity  finance.  Blass  and  Yosha 
(2003) find that R&D intensive firms in Israel do not rely more on cash flow, unlike firms in 
several OECD countries, probably because they were able to raise inexpensive external equity 
financing on a booming stock exchange. Aghion et al. (2004), analysing an unbalanced panel 
of 900 UK listed firms, find that R&D firms first prefer debt, as it involves giving up fewer 
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control rights than new equity; however, more highly innovative firms are more likely to issue 
new equity. As for Italian firms, the previous evidence shows no major differences in the 
financial structure of innovative firms (Pozzolo, 2003).
4 However, Nucci et al (2004) show that 
there is a negative relationship between leverage and intangible assets, which they interpret as 
evidence  that  less  leveraged  firms  tend  to  be  more  innovative.  In  a  different  direction, 
Benfratello et al (2006) show that banking development influences the probability of process 
innovation, in particular for small firms. 
Overall, the problem associated with financial debt for high tech firms could be even 
greater for small firms, as large companies suffer less from asymmetric information and the 
connected adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard problems;  they  also  have  more  collateral  to 
secure  their  loans.  Moreover,  small  firms  can  find  it  difficult  to  collect  external  equity. 
Therefore, small innovative firms can have more trouble in financing their innovative activity, 
as clearly stated in Hall (2002). When they need external finance, they are more likely to obtain 
debt from lenders at worse conditions (higher interest rate or shorter maturity) due to their 
asymmetric  information  problems,  whereas  outside  equity  seems  to  be  the  most  suitable 
financial source for innovation. It is possible therefore to observe for small innovative firms 
either a large increase in internal finance or a pronounced funding gap, with firms investing 
less than they would be if debt were a perfect substitute for internal finance. Notwithstanding 
the importance of this point, due to data limitation there is not much evidence on the financing 
problems  of  small  innovators.  The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  carefully  analyse  the  financial 
structures of small innovative firms compared with other types of firms, building on previous 
studies on this issue. Finally, we want to assess the impact of different financial structures on 
firms’ investment policies. Some previous studies on this final issue do not generally split the 
sample by firm size, such as Bond et al (2003b), who find that in the UK the investments of 
innovative firms are less sensitive to cash flow, and Brown (1997), who finds the opposite. 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), who uncover that both R&D and physical investments are 
sensitive to cash flow for US small firms in high tech industries, actually work with small 
firms that are publicly traded and face fewer difficulties in collecting external finance.  
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share of information and technology capital.     9 
3. The sources of data used in the analysis  
The first dataset used in this paper is the Survey of Manufacturing Firms (SMF), which is 
carried out every three years and covers a wide range of topics.
5 The sample consists of about 
4,500 manufacturing firms (4,600 in the wave 1998 2000) and is stratified by geographical 
area, industry and firm size; all the firms with more than 500 employees are included. Data on 
financial structures are also available for a sub sample of firms and span a longer period. This 
dataset is useful for our purposes because it allows us to single out firms that are innovative 
according  to  the  definition  specified  in  the  Introduction,  i.e.  firms  that  declare  they  are 
innovative and have some sales of new products.
6 Further, the SMF also contains separate 
information  on  R&D  expenditures,  whereas  in  the  other  dataset  used  in  the  analysis,  the 
Company  Accounts  Database  (CADS, Centrale  dei Bilanci),  which  collects  firms’ balance 
sheets, R&D expenditures are often included in other items and could not be elicited. The 
drawback of the SMF is that financial indicators often have several missing values and are 
much less detailed than those in the CADS. Specifically, in the CADS there are data on the 
sources and uses of funds, which are very useful for the type of analysis we aim at in this 
paper. 
For these reasons, we also use the CADS dataset.
7 The CADS has been gathering data on 
firms’ balance sheets since 1982 from a consortium of banks; balance sheets are reclassified to 
ensure cross sectional comparability. The dataset is not randomly drawn, since firms enter only 
if they borrow from one of the banks in the consortium and is tilted towards medium and large 
firms. In order to have a long period of consecutive observations for the analysis, we merge the 
                                                           
5 The SMF Survey is conducted by the “Ossevatorio sulle Piccole and Medie Imprese” (Centre of Study on 
Small and Medium Firms), an institution associated with Capitalia, an Italian bank. More detailed information can 
be found on the website www.capitalia.it  
6 The wording of the questions is “During the past three years, did the firm introduce product or process 
innovations?” and  “What share of revenue is accounted for by products that have not changed in the last three 
years?”; we use the complement of this share. Actually new products are not exactly innovative products, which is 
the word used in the Community Innovation Survey carried out by Eurostat. In this paper, however, we also 
condition the definition of innovative firms on the fact that the firm has introduced either product or process 
innovations.   
7 CADS is a private company set up in 1983 by the Bank of Italy and the leading Italian commercial banks. 
The sample covers around 40,000 non financial firms per year and in 2002 accounted for 40 per cent of the value 
added of the sector of non financial firms, based on the institutional accounts prepared by the National Statistics 
Institute. For further information on the data, see the Centrale dei Bilanci website (www.centraledeibilanci.com).       10 
last wave of the SMF (1998 2000) with the CADS from 1993 to 2000.
8 After the merge, we 
come up with a dataset made up of around 15,500 firm year observations (roughly 1800 2000 
firms for 8 years).  
In this way, it is possible to identify innovative firms on the basis of the last SMF survey 
and  to  have  continuous  data  on  the  firms’  financial  structures  and  physical  investments 
spanning  the  period  1993  to  2000.
9  An  important  assumption  in  the  paper  is  that  a  firm 
declaring  itself  to  be  innovative  in  the  last  wave  of  the  SMF  (1998 2000)  is  considered 
innovative for the whole period spanning 1993 to 2000, on the grounds of the high persistence 
in R&D and innovation activity. This is essentially due to the high adjustment costs associated 
with the fact that this activity is mainly embedded in human capital.  However, in order to 
verify the results obtained, we also carry out an analysis that identifies innovative firms on the 
basis of the last two SMF waves (1995 1997 and 1998 2000) subsequently merged with the 
CADS; this allows firms to enter and exit the innovative status. The SMF has a small panel 
component and this results in a lower number of firm year observations, roughly 6,000 (more 
than 700 firms for 8 years). 
Table 1 reports some general firm characteristics for the whole sample obtained through 
merging the last SMF wave (1998 2000) and the CADS (1993 2000). Statistics are also split 
by firm’s innovative attitude: 29 per cent of the firms in the sample are innovative on the basis 
of the definition used in this paper. Innovative firms are on average larger, more profitable, 
grow at a faster rate, have a higher share of intangible assets on fixed assets (tangible plus 
intangible) and are more likely to be located in the northern regions; all these differences are 
statistically significant. Regarding financial structure, innovative firms seem to rely on slightly 
higher leverage and the maturity of their financial debts is longer; the flow of funds’ indicators 
highlight that innovative firms have a much higher ratio of cash flow to total financial sources 
and a lower ratio of trade debt.  
                                                           
8 We choose to draw data from the 1993 CADS because since that year the CADS has included some smaller 
firms covered by the Chambers of Commerce (Cerved), a database containing balance sheets of all incorporated 
companies, which is therefore less tilted towards medium and large firms.  
9 Our final sample of firms has a similar composition, according to industry and geographical area, to the 
whole samples in the CADS and the SMF. However, it is more tilted towards medium and large firms than the 
SFM sample: after the merging, the median (mean) size increases from 24 (87) in the SMF to 39 (155) in our 
sample. However, the median size (39) is still quite small compared with other analyses on this topic.        11 
4. The analysis of financial structures  
In this section, we turn to a more detailed analysis of the differences in firms’ financial 
structures by both innovative attitude and size. A firm is classified as small if its average size 
during the period of analysis (1993 2000) is less than or equal to 20 employees, the 1
st quartile 
of the sample distribution.  
In the upper panel of Table 2, statistics split by firm innovative attitude and size are 
reported on four financial structure indicators: equity and financial debts on total liabilities, 
leverage (financial debts normalised to equity plus financial debts) and the share of short term 
debts on total financial debts. Focusing on statistics by innovative attitude for the two size 
groups, small and large firms (columns 4 and 5), the main evidence is that leverage is lower for 
small  innovative  firms  compared  with  firms  of  the  same  size  that  do  not  innovate  (39.1 
compared  to  44.3),  whereas  for  large  innovative  firms  leverage  tends  to  increase  slightly 
compared with non innovative firms of similar size (49.4 compared to 47.6).
10 Further, the 
share of short term debt is very high (around 77) for small innovative firms and shows no 
difference  compared  with  small  non innovative  firms;  on  the  contrary,  debt  maturity  is 
increasing in the group of large firms that have an innovative attitude. The most important 
point is that small innovative firms rely less on financial debts, which are made up mainly of 
bank loans in this sample. This is probably explained by the reasons outlined in Section 2: 
small innovative firms are particularly difficult to evaluate, have a lower share of tangible 
assets on total assets and a higher share of intangible assets on fixed assets, compared with 
firms  of  similar  size  that  do  not  innovate  (Table  3);  they  could  therefore  be  considered 
particularly risky by lenders. Nothing similar appears in the group of large firms. This also 
explains why the share of short term debt does not decrease with their innovative attitude, as 
happens in the group of large firms; banks rely on short term debt as a monitoring device for 
small firms. However, short term debt does not suit innovative firms, which are likely to be 
involved in long term investment projects.  
                                                           
10 More precisely, this is due to a reduction in financial debts for small innovative firms and to a decrease in 
equity for large innovative firms. Bank debts account for the most important part of financial debts: the median 
value of their ratio is 97 per cent, while the average value is 81 per cent.     12 
In the lower panel of Table 2, we turn to the financial ratios based on the sources and 
uses of funds; the ratios are measured as cash flow, new debt, new equity and new trade debt, 
normalised by total financial sources. The average ratios by firm size and innovative attitude 
are calculated first by averaging the ratio by firm over years and then over firms.
11 The most 
remarkable result in the lower panel of Table 2 is that the share of cash flow on total financial 
sources is far higher for small innovative firms compared with small non innovative firms 
(55.8 versus 32.6); the increase is much less important for the group of large firms (51.1 versus 
45.8). Further, the incidence of new debt is higher for innovative firms only in the group of 
large  size.  No  statistical  significant  differences  emerge  either  for  the  frequency  of  issuing 
equities or for the incidence of new equities to total sources on the basis of innovative attitude. 
Finally, small innovative firms have a high share of trade debt to total sources (more than 40), 
which does not decrease with their innovative attitude, unlike large firms. Table 3 contains 
some statistics on cash flow and physical investments normalised to the replacement value of 
the  firm  capital:  as  before,  the  ratio  of  cash  flow  appears  to  be  much  higher  for  small 
innovative  firms  compared  with  small  non innovative  firms  (66.1  versus  46.0);  as  a 
consequence, cash flow net of investments is also higher for small innovative firms. However, 
when R&D investments are also considered, net cash flow becomes negative exclusively for 
small innovative firms ( 9.7).  
On the grounds that different firm characteristics may have an impact on firms’ financial 
structures, in order to verify the robustness of the differences in financial indicators observed in 
Table 2, we rely on an econometric analysis whose results are reported in Tables 4a and 4b. 
We focus on the indicators that show the most remarkable differences in previous descriptive 
statistics:  leverage  and  the  share  of  cash  flow  on  total  sources.  Moreover,  we  also  report 
estimations  for  new  equity,  as  the  multivariate  analysis  elicits  some  new  evidence.  For 
leverage, which is censored between 0 and 1, we report a Tobit panel random effect estimation; 
for the share of cash flow on total sources, we rely on OLS estimations (between and fixed 
                                                           
11 The alternative approach of using each firm year observation as a data point for calculating the overall 
average would understate the importance of some external finance if it is “lumpy” because of fixed issue costs, as 
for equity (Carpenter and Petersen 2002a). On the whole, there is a huge variability of these flow of funds 
indicators within the firm, which is likely to introduce some noise rather than information. When calculating the 
average ratio by using the firm year observations, no statistical significant differences emerge between the groups 
of firms analysed. However, in the subsequent econometric analysis, we also try to exploit the within variability of 
these indicators to get as much information as possible.      13 
effect panel estimations); for the incidence of new equity on total sources, the results obtained 
with a pooled Heckman estimation are reported. We consider to be explanatory variables the 
firm’s characteristics that should mainly influence firm financing choices: Blass and Yosha 
(2003) and Aghion et al (2004) use similar explanatory variables in running such a type of 
regression. In detail, we use the firm’s size (the number of employees) and age, the share of 
tangible assets (net equipment and gross plant) on total assets, a profitability measure (ROA, 
i.e. the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets), a dummy for firms belonging 
to a group, as well as 3 area and 15 industry dummies. Finally, a dummy for innovative firms is 
included to verify whether the differences in financial indicators previously commented hold 
after controlling for some other important firm characteristics. It is worth clarifying that we do 
not aim to find any causal relationship between innovative attitude and financing policy; our 
purpose is more modest, as we would like to uncover some systematic differences in financing 
attitudes between innovative and non innovative firms of different sizes, after controlling for 
other variables that could affect financing decisions. Firms need to be in the sample for at least 
two years. Finally, to tackle simultaneity problems, one period lagged explanatory variables 
are used. The final sample is made up of roughly 12,000 observations for more than 2,000 
firms.  
The econometric evidence confirms that leverage is higher for innovative firms (Table 
4a, column 2). However, as in the descriptive statistics, this is true only in the group of large 
firms (column 4). For small firms, the presence of an innovative attitude reduces leverage by 4 
percentage points (column 3): this is the marginal effect calculated at the mean value of the 
other independent variables, around 10 per cent of the average value of leverage. This result 
also arises in a pooled Tobit estimation and in a panel Tobit estimation which uses interaction 
terms rather than split. More importantly, it is also confirmed in an unreported Tobit panel 
random  effects  estimation  based  on  a  smaller  sample,  in  which  we  consider  the  panel 
component of the last two waves of the SMF (1995 1997 and 1998 2000) and merge it with the 
CADS. This estimation allows a more precise identification of innovative firms as it permits a 
firm either to enter or exit the innovative status.
12 As for the cash flow indicator, a panel 
                                                           
12 Some other unreported Tobit estimations confirm that leverage is always increasing with firm size, though 
more strongly in the group of innovative firms. Econometric estimations therefore confirm that small innovative 
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between estimation is presented (Table 4a, last three columns): this estimation exploits only 
cross section variability and is more in line with statistics calculated first by averaging data by 
firm over years and then over firms. The evidence shows that cash flow on total sources is far 
higher for small innovative firms compared with non innovative firms of the same size; when 
controlling for other firm characteristics, this is no longer true in the group of large firms. A 
similar result is obtained with a pooled OLS regression. More interestingly, we also run a 
regression on the sample obtained merging the panel component of the last two waves of the 
SMF with the CADS. In an unreported panel fixed effects estimation exploiting only time 
series variability, which is possible in this case as the innovative dummy is varying over time, 
the previous evidence of an increase in cash flow for small innovative firms is confirmed, even 
after controlling for the unobserved firm heterogeneity. Though not reported, the econometric 
evidence also confirms that debt maturity increases with innovative attitude, but only for large 
firms.  
Compared  with  descriptive  statistics,  the  econometric  analysis  uncovers  some  new 
evidence about outside equity. We run a Heckman estimation on the pooled sample, as the 
errors in the probability model of issuing equities and in the equation concerning the amount of 
issued equities are correlated. The identification strategy is based on the fact that age and the 
share of tangible assets appear not to be significant in the select equation for issuing equities 
and are therefore omitted. As for the probability of issuing new equity (at least once in the 
period under analysis), no difference emerges according to firm innovative attitude (Table 4b, 
columns 2 4). On the contrary, an interesting feature emerges when focusing on the incidence 
of new equity on total sources, conditional on issuing (Table 4b, columns 5 7): this incidence is 
higher for small innovative than for small non innovative firms; no significant differences arise 
in the group of large firms. Apparently, when small firms have the possibility to collect outside 
equity, they try to exploit this form of financing in an important way.
 13   
                                                                                                                                                                                        
firms  have  lower  leverage  than  large  innovative  firms:  the  marginal  effect  is  around   14  percentage  points, 
compared with   6 points in the group of non innovative firms. 
13 For the sake of clarity, this evidence is based on the incidence of new equity on total sources varying for 
each firm in each year. With a Heckman estimation on the sample made by merging the last two waves of the 
SMF with the CADS, the result does not hold; this is probably due to the drop in the number of observations of 
small innovative firms issuing equities (only 80 small firms issue equities, of which 11 are innovative).       15 
Summing up, the evidence in this section shows that small innovative firms use less 
financial debts and significantly more cash flow compared with non innovative firms of the 
same  size;  further,  they  rely  on  equities  more  than  small  non innovative  firms.  Fewer 
differences appear for large innovative firms compared with companies of similar size that do 
not  innovate.  In  general,  large  innovative  firms  continue  to  rely  on  their  usual  financial 
instruments and, more specifically, they do not seem to find any difficulties in gathering more 
funds from banks, notwithstanding their innovation activity, probably because they are less 
affected by information problems. In the next section, we turn to an analysis aimed at verifying 
the impact of such different financial structures on the firm’s investment policies, as before by 
splitting the sample according to firm size and innovation status.    
5. The firms’ investment sensitivity to cash flow  
5.1  The estimation method  
In  order  to  verify  the  implications  of  different  firms’  financial  structures  on  their 
investment policy, this section is devoted to carrying out an estimation on the physical capital 
investment sensitivity to cash flow, following a wide empirical literature that started with the 
seminal paper by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). This literature has been the object of 
some  major  criticisms  (Kaplan  and  Zingales,  1997  and  2000).  However,  a  recent  paper 
(Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006) has shown that in a model in which borrowing constraints 
arise as part of the optimal design of a lending contract, investment is sensitive to cash flow 
innovations;  further,  this  sensitivity  decreases  with  age  and  size,  some  typical  proxies  of 
information asymmetries.  
The focus is on the estimation of an error correction model (ECM).
14 In the neo classical 
model of investments, for a profit maximising firm with a constant elasticity of substitution 
production function, the desired level of the capital stock ( it k ) is a log linear function of the 
ouput ( it y ), measured by sales, and the user cost of capital ( it c ), while  t a  is a time varying 
parameter capturing technical change and s  is the elasticity of substitution:  
                                                           
14 In this part of the paper we follow Mulkay et al (2001) and Bond et al (2003a).      16 
(1)    it it t it c y a k s b - + =  
This is true if adjustment costs are negligible. If there are adjustment costs, the previous 
formulation may be nested with an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) dynamic regression 
model. For the sake of simplifying the notation, we show the derivation of the equation with an 
ADL (2,2):  
(2)  it t i t i it t i t i it t i t i it c c c y y y k a k a a k e g g g b b b + + + + + + + + + = - - - - - - 2 , 2 1 , 1 0 2 , 2 1 , 1 0 2 , 2 1 , 1 0  
If  we  re parameterise  the  model  in  an  error  correction  form,  short run  and  long run 
effects (in levels) can be separated out. 
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In order to estimate this model some assumptions are required. First, we assume that the 
user cost of capital ( it c ) can be captured by additive firm specific effects ( i h ) and year specific 
effects  ( t m ).  Then,  the  approximation  i t i it y i K I k d - » D -1 , , /   is  used  for  the  growth  rate  of 
capital, where  i d , the depreciation rate, is captured by the firm specific effect. Finally, in order 
to analyse the importance of internal finance, we include the current ratio of the cash flow to 
the beginning of period capital stock ( 1 , . / - t i t i K CF ).
15  
Summing up, the model to be estimated in this section is (4): 
it t i t i it t i t i t i it t i t i t i t i K CF y y k y y K I K I e m h y f q w w r + + + + + - + D + D + = - - - - - - - ) / ( ) ( ) / ( ) / 1 , 0 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 0 2 . 1 , 1 1 , ,
  
With GMM one can estimate the model in differences, using the lagged levels of the 
variables as instruments. However, a well known problem of the original difference GMM 
estimator, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), is that the lagged levels of variables are 
often poor instruments for their first differences, especially for variables that are close to a 
random walk (Bond, 2002). Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest 
that if the original equations in levels are added to the system, additional moment conditions 
                                                           
15 We do not include lagged levels of cash flow in the estimation as they turn out to be not significant. They 
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can  be  brought  in:  they  require  stronger  assumptions,  but  can  be  highly  informative  and 
increase efficiency. This is the one step system GMM estimator used in this paper.  
5.2 The estimation results  
The results of the GMM estimation of equation 4 are reported in Table 5. The sample 
used after trimming, lagging variables and considering firms that are present for at least five 
years is made up of 4,640 observations for 928 firms: 300 are innovative firms (282 large size 
and 18 small size) and 628 are non innovative firms (549 large size and 79 small size).  
Model 1 of Table 5 reports the estimation with cash flow (CF) interacted with a dummy 
equal to one when the firm is innovative. The interaction term has a negative and significant 
coefficient: this clearly shows that physical investments of innovative firms are less sensitive to 
cash flow compared with non innovative firms. This result is similar to the findings of Bond et 
al  (2003b)  for  UK  firms:  they  argue  that  innovative  firms,  knowing  that  they  could  have 
financing problems at some time in the future, are “deep pocket” firms; for this reason their 
physical investments show a lower sensitivity to cash flow. In model 2 we dwell in more detail 
on this point by letting the coefficient of CF be different for 4 types of firms; cash flow is 
interacted with four dummies: d1 is a dummy equal to one for large innovative firms, d2 for 
small innovative, d4 for large non innovative and d5 for small non innovative. The evidence is 
that the strong reduction in investment sensitivity to cash flow for innovative firms in model 1 
is exclusively explained by small innovative compared with small non innovative firms (d2 
versus d5). The difference in CF coefficients is significant in the group of small firms (see tests 
in the medium panel of the table), with small non innovative firms characterised by a high and 
significant sensitivity to CF and small innovative firms unaffected by CF. On the contrary, the 
difference in the CF coefficients is not statistically significant in the group of large firms (d1 
versus d4), whose investments turn out to be always broadly unaffected by CF. This result is 
quite interesting and we think it is likely to be linked to the fact that, as seen in Section 4, small 
firms rely significantly more on cash flow when they are innovative than non innovators of the 
same size. Therefore, their demand function of funds for investment is likely to cross the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
are therefore used in the estimation as instruments for the current level of cash flow.      18 
supply function in the flat section of the curve of internal finance, where changes in CF have 
no impact on investment policy (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002b).   
In model 3 we report the same evidence as in model 2 referring to the smaller sample of 
just 399 firms, obtained with the panel component of the last two waves of the SMF (1995 
1997 and 1998 2000) merged with the CADS (1993 2000). As in the previous section, the aim 
is to verify the estimation results with a more precise definition of innovative firms, i.e. letting 
firms enter and exit the innovative status. Similarly to model 2, we can see that the reduction in 
CF sensitivity for innovative firms is entirely explained by small innovative compared with 
small  non innovative  firms,  whereas  the  difference  in  the  group  of  large  firms  is  not 
statistically significant. It is also worth noting that with this sample of firms we are able to 
perform an analysis of R&D expenditure sensitivity to CF, given that for some firms we have 
six consecutive years of R&D expenditure; we impute R&D equal to zero for firms that have 
missing R&D. We can perform this type of analysis both for innovative and non innovative 
firms,  because  both  types  of  firms  are  actually  engaged  in  R&D  activity  (Table  1).  The 
evidence in model 4 of Table 5, which should be interpreted as suggestive given the modest 
size of the sample, is that only small innovative firms present a significant CF sensitivity for 
R&D expenditure; this clearly differentiates them from large innovative firms, whose R&D 
expenditure is not influenced by CF innovation. A possible interpretation of this result is that 
small innovative firms, which rely strongly on internal funds, face no particular problems in 
financing their physical investments. However, on average, cash flow might not be sufficient to 
cover  also  R&D  investments,  which  therefore  show  a  tendency  to  increase  with  positive 
innovations in cash flow. This evidence is consistent with descriptive statistics in Table 3: cash 
flow  net  of  physical  investments,  normalised  on  capital,  is  significantly  higher  for  small 
innovative firms than for small non innovative and also large innovative firms; however, when 
R&D investments are also considered in netting cash flow, small innovative firms are the only 
group of firms showing a negative net cash flow. They could therefore face some specific 
problems in financing R&D investments.  
6. Extensions and sensitivity analysis  
The aim of this section is to extend the analysis and to verify that the previous findings 
are not determined by the particular choices of the sample and variables.      19 
In model 5 of Table 5, we report the evidence on the physical investment sensitivity to 
cash flow for six different types of firms. In this case, as before small firms have 20 employees 
or less, medium firms have between 20 and 50 employees, and large firms have more than 50 
employees (d3 is the dummy for medium innovative firms and d6 for medium non innovative 
firms).
16  The  evidence  is  similar  to  that  presented  in  model  2,  i.e.  the  reduction  in  the 
investment sensitivity to CF for innovative firms is largely explained by small innovative firms 
(d2 versus d5), although in this case the difference is also statistically significant for large firms 
with more than 50 employees (d1 versus d4). No difference emerges in the group of medium 
firms (d3 versus d6). More interestingly, in model 6 we report the evidence obtained with an 
estimation in which the CF is considered a predetermined variable, i.e. a variable which is 
correlated with the current error term, but not with the past error term; in this case, we can use 
as an instrument for the current CF also the CF lagged at t 1.
17 We do not dwell on this point 
before, because for the estimation with 4 different types of firms, reported in model 2, the 
evidence with the predetermined CF does not change too much: aside from the fact that CF is 
significant for all types of firms, because it is probably better instrumented, innovative firms 
are less sensitive to cash flow than non innovative firms and this difference is still entirely 
accounted for by small firms. We prefer to present and comment the evidence obtained with 
the more conservative assumption that CF is endogenous and therefore we use lagged values 
starting from t 2 as instruments. However, the estimation with predetermined CF for 6 types of 
firms is quite interesting because in this case new evidence arises. In model 6 of Table 5, 
medium innovative firms appear to have a higher sensitivity to CF than the other two groups of 
innovative  firms  (0.49  compared  with  roughly  0.14)  and  the  differences  are  statistically 
significant (d1 versus d3 and d2 versus d3). As in all other previous estimations, only small 
innovative firms explain the reduction in sensitivity to CF in the group of innovative firms (d2 
versus d5). We find the results concerning medium size firms particularly meaningful given 
that,  through  similar  estimations  to  those  reported  in  Table  4a,  we  are  able  to  verify  that 
medium innovative firms rely on much more leverage than medium non innovative firms (the 
                                                           
16 The number of firms in different groups is the following: there are 300 innovative firms, 216 large, 66 
medium and 18 small; among the 628 non innovative firms, 354 are large, 195 medium and 79 small. Actually, 
according to European Union legislation, firms with less than 50 employees are still considered small firms; we 
call them medium size firms in order to distinguish them from the group of very small firms analysed before. 
17 As already said, the lagged value of CF at t 1 is not significant in the equation and therefore can be 
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marginal  effect  is  7  p.p.  at  the  mean  values);  actually,  all  the  increase  in  leverage  in  the 
previous group of large firms is explained by medium firms; companies with more than 50 
employees do not have any increase in leverage. Further, medium innovative firms do not show 
any increase in the incidence of cash flow on total sources compared with firms of similar size 
that do not innovate. Given that financial debt is not the most suitable instrument to finance 
innovation, it could be that medium innovative firms find themselves facing a marginal cost of 
debt that is rapidly increasing with the amount of funds required; in this case, a change in 
internal CF can have a strong impact on investments (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002b).  
Secondly,  we  consider  what  happens  to  the  investment  estimation  when  the  whole 
sample is split on the basis of the firm belonging to a high tech sector.
18 The evidence shows 
that in the high tech sectors (307 firms) no firms show a significant sensitivity to cash flow 
(model 1, Table 6); in non high tech sectors (632 firms; model 2 of Table 6), the evidence is 
similar to that reported in model 2 of Table 5: small firms explain entirely the reduction in the 
investment sensitivity for innovative firms. Apparently, the results for the whole sample are 
mainly driven by what happens in the non high tech sectors, whereas the investments in firms 
belonging to high tech sectors are never affected by internal financial resources.  
In another estimation, we check the sensitivity of the results in the investment estimation 
to a different measure of cash flow. The one used in the paper is taken directly from the flow of 
funds indicators. In the estimation reported in model 3 of Table 6, we use a different measure 
of cash flow calculated from the balance sheet. The same results hold. We also try a similar 
unreported estimation with the book value of capital, rather than its replacement value: it turns 
out that still the only significant difference in the investment sensitivity to CF is between small 
innovative and small non innovative firms. As a more general sensitivity analysis, we run the 
estimations in Tables 4a and 4b and the baseline estimation in Table 5 excluding firms with 
more than 500 employees, which are all considered in the SMF survey, while the others firms 
are included according to a stratification survey design. All the previous results are confirmed; 
model 4 in Table 6 reports the result for the estimation on investments. The final sensitivity 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
considered a valid instrument.   
18 On the grounds of the classification used in other empirical papers (Benfratello et al 2006, Carpenter and 
Petersen,  2002a),  high tech  sectors  are  defined  as  the  following:  chemicals,  non electrical  machinery,  office 
     21 
analysis concerns the size classification: in the paper, we classify firms on the basis of the 
average number of employees during the period (1993 2000) and therefore the classification is 
fixed over time. When we let firms exit and enter the two different size groups, results are 
similar for the estimation on investments (Table 6, model 5); for the estimations concerning 
financial structures, the evidence is along the same lines, though less clear cut.    
Finally, in order to show that our definition of innovative firms adds some value to the 
analysis, we run the baseline estimation in Table 5 after changing it. We first consider as 
innovative those firms that have R&D activity on the basis of what they stated in the last SMF 
survey. There are more firms that do R&D activity in the sample (50 per cent)
19 compared with 
those that can be defined innovative on the basis of the previous definition (29 per cent). The 
evidence is that there is no clear cut difference between innovative and non innovative firms in 
their investment sensitivity to cash flow: small firms appear to have a higher sensitivity, which 
is similar for innovative and non innovative companies. On the whole, the picture is more 
blurred and no clear cut evidence emerges. Further, leverage does not decrease and cash flow 
does not increase for small innovative firms, compared with small non innovative firms. We 
also try another definition of innovative firms: firms are considered innovative if they belong to 
a high tech sector defined as before (32 per cent of the sample). As in the previous case, no 
statistical significant difference arises between different groups of firms, specifically between 
small  innovative  and  non innovative  firms,  either  in  their  financial  structure  or  in  their 
investment sensitivity to cash flow. Therefore, the evidence that we uncover in this paper, by 
using  the  specific  definition  of  innovative  firms  mentioned  above,  does  not  emerge  when 
considering alternative definitions. We argue that focusing on firms that have already obtained 
an output from their innovative activity allows us to capture the neatest differences between 
different types of firms.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
equipment and computers, electric machinery equipment, electronic material, medical equipment, vehicles and 
other transports. 
19 It is worth clarifying that, in the last wave of the SFM Survey (1998 2000), the share of R&D performing 
firms is lower (38 per cent). The higher share of R&D performing in the sample used in the analysis (50) is due to 
the positive relationship between R&D and firm size.      22 
7. Concluding remarks and discussion  
In this paper we uncover some new evidence about the financing of small innovative 
firms in Italy. We do not have definitive explanations, but we highlight some patterns that 
suggest future research on the very small innovative firms in other countries.  
Small innovative Italian firms have noticeably different financial structures compared 
with small non innovative firms: they rely more on internal resources and less on bank loans. 
For large firms this is not true: their financial structures do not differ very much according to 
innovative attitude; information problems connected with the innovation activity do not appear 
to  affect  their  financing  decisions.  We  also  verify  how  these  different  financial  structures 
impact on the firms’ investment policies. It turns out that innovative firms have lower physical 
investment sensitivity to cash flow. Interestingly, we also find that this result is explained 
exclusively by small innovative firms compared with non innovative firms of similar size. The 
investments of large firms are always broadly unaffected by cash flow innovations; more in 
general, there is no difference in their sensitivity according to innovative status. Therefore, 
small innovative firms seem to avoid the financing constraints faced by small non innovative 
firms by relying on a strong increase in cash flow. However, there is mild evidence that they 
could face difficulties in financing R&D expenditure compared with large innovative firms.        
Overall, it seems that the possibility to collect more external financial resources could be 
particularly useful for small innovative firms in order to reduce their need for internal funds. 
As financial debt has specific problems in financing innovation, at least for small firms as 
mentioned in Section 2, outside equity could be particularly valuable. This paper contains 
evidence in this direction: when small innovative firms rely on outside equity, the incidence of 
new equity on total financial sources is higher compared with non innovative firms of the same 
size. Nothing similar appears in the group of large firms. Hence, small innovative firms seem 
to be interested in collecting funds through outside equity. This finding is consistent with Del 
Colle et al (2006): their analysis shows that venture capital in Italy, as in the United States, is 
more likely to finance small and riskier firms.  
The  policy  implication  is  clear.  Equity  finance  should  be  more  widespread  as  it  is 
particularly  suited  to  small  innovative  firms.  Unlike  financial  debt,  it  does  not  require 
collateral, does not raise the probability of financial distress and allows unbounded investor     23 
returns.  Venture capital  is the  form  of  equity  finance  that  could  be best  suited to  address 
financing problems of small innovative firms. Venture capitalists monitor firms and can at least 
partially overcome information and agency problems. In the United States, the majority of 
venture capital is indeed invested in high tech sectors and is highly focused on early stage 
investments, where asymmetric information problems are the greatest (Gompers, 1995).  
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Tables and Figures  
        
Table 1 
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF INNOVATIVE FIRMS  
(mean and median values over 1993 2000, ratios are in percentage)  
 
         
  Whole sample  Non innovative firms   Innovative firms   T test 
p value 
         
         
General characteristics          
Size (No. employees)   110 (39)  99 (35)  136 (53)  0.00 
Age   21 (18)  21 (18)  21 (18)  0.99 
Profits   8.0 (6.6)  7.7 (6.5)  8.5 (7.0)  0.00 
Sales growth   6.2 (5.6)  5.8 (5.1)  7.3 (6.5)  0.00 
Tangible assets/total assets    21.5 (19.4)  21.6 (19.4)  21.4 (19.5)  0.30 
Intangible assets /fixed assets   8.7 (3.0)  8.6 (2.7)  9.2 (3.5)  0.01 
North   67.3  64.5  74.1  0.00 
Centre   20.8  21.6  18.8  0.00 
South  11.9  13.9  7.1  0.00 
         
Financial structure         
Equity/total liabilities   24.9 (22.2)  25.1 (22.3)  24.6 (21.8)  0.04 
Financial debts/total liabilities   26.2 (26.1)  26.1 (26.0)  26.4 (26.2)  0.37 
Leverage   47.1 (51.6)  46.8 (51.1)  47.9 (53.0)  0.02 
Short term debts/total financial debts   69.7 (76.2)  70.9 (78.1)  66.9 (72.2)  0.00 
         
Cash flow/total sources  45.2 (42.2)  42.4 (39.6)  51.8 (45.9)  0.00 
New debt/total sources   22.3 (21.3)  21.8 (21.3)  23.5 (21.3)  0.37 
New equity/total sources   3.1 (0.0)  3.2 (0.0)  2.9 (0.0)  0.09 
New trade debt/total sources  26.6 (17.1)  28.0 (17.4)  23.2 (15.2)  0.02 
         
Investment attitude          
Physical investments/capital (t 1)  22.3 (13.3)  22.2 (12.8)  22.5 (14.2)  0.59 
Cash flow/capital (t 1)  36.4 (22.3)  35.7 (21.6)  38.2 (24.0)  0.02 
(Cash flow Investments)/capital (t 1)  12.7 (7.1)  12.0 (6.8)  14.1 (8.0)  0.02 
         
R&D expenditures /capital (t 1)  8.9 (3.0)  7.2 (2.4)  10.7 (3.7)  0.00 
(Cash flow  Inv R&D)/capital (t 1)  2.0 (2.3)  2.7 (2.6)  1.3 (2.0)  0.39 
         
No. observations with R&D in 98 00  2,107   1,118   989    





The sample is made up of firms answering the SMF Survey 1998 2000 and having corresponding balance sheets in the CADS 
1993 2000; observations belonging to the 1
st and the 99
th percentiles are dropped. T test for equal means in the two sub groups 
(innovative and non innovative firms) under the assumption of unequal variances is reported in the last column. The number of 
observations refers to the dataset before any cleaning. Innovative firms declare they are innovative and have a share of sales 
that can be imputed to new products. Financial ratios based on total sources are first averaged by firm and then over firms. 
R&D expenditures are from the SMF survey (1998 2000) and therefore refer only to the period 1998 2000 and to firms with 
positive R&D, which can be either innovative or not. See the Appendix for further details on the variables.      25 
Table 2 
FINANCIAL INDICATORS BY FIRM INNOVATIVE ATTITUDE AND SIZE  
(mean and median values over 1993 2000, ratios are in percentage) 
 
  Non innovative firms   Innovative firms            Small firms   Large firms 
  by size   by size   by innovative attitude   by innovative attitude   
  Small  Large  Small  Large   Non  
innovative 
Innovative    Non  
innovative  
Innovative   
                 
Equity / 
total liabilities  
21.3 (17.8)  26.4 (23.8)  22.3 (19.1)  24.9 (22.1)  21.3 (17.8)  22.3 (19.1)  26.4 (23.8)  24.9 (22.2) 
T test p value   0.000  0.000  0.159  0.000 
Financial debts / 
total liabilities 
23.7 (22.7)  27.0 (27.0)  20.8 (16.6)  27.4 (27.2)  23.7 (22.7)  20.8 (16.6)  27.0 (27.0)  27.4 (27.2) 
T test p value  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.303 
Leverage 
 
44.3 (50.4)  47.6 (51.1)  39.1 (37.6)  49.4 (54.2)  44.3 (50.4)  39.1 (37.6)  47.6 (51.2)   49.4 (54.2) 
T test p value   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
Short-term financial 
debts/financial debts 
77.3 (89.2)  69.0 (75.2)  77.4 (94.4)  65.7 (70.7)  77.3 (89.2)  77.4 (94.4)  69.0 (75.2)  65.7 (70.7) 
T test p value   0.000  0.000  0.930  0.000 
 
THE SOURCES OF FINANCE BY FIRM INNOVATIVE ATTITUDE AND SIZE 
(mean and median values, ratios are in percentage) 
 
                 
Cash flow /total 
sources 
32.6 (25.1)  45.8 (43.7)  55.8 (41.1)  51.1 (46.3)  32.6 (25.1)  55.8 (41.1)  45.8 (43.7)  51.1 (46.3) 
T test p value   0.000  0.425  0.000  0.009 
New debt / 
Total sources 
26.2 (21.2)  20.3 (21.4)  21.0 (18.0)  24.0 (22.0)  26.2 (21.2)  21.0 (18.0)  20.3 (21.4)  24.0 (22.0) 
T test p value   0.020  0.560  0.327  0.068 
New equity / 
Total sources 
2.7 (0.0)  3.4 (0.0)  2.0 (0.0)  3.0 (0.0)  2.7 (0.0)  2.0 (0.0)  3.4 (0.0)  3.0 (0.0) 
T test p value   0.002  0.018  0.129  0.093 
New equity / 
total sources for 
firms issuing equities  
9.7 (4.5)  8.3 (3.9)  9.2 (6.4)  7.8 (2.8)  9.7 (4.5)  9.2 (6.4)   8.3 (3.9)  7.8 (2.8) 
T test p value  0.004  0.004  0.486  0.167 
Frequency of issuing 
equities  
12.4   17.5  12.9  16.9  12.4  12.9  17.5  16.9 
T test p value  0.000  0.006  0.710  0.379 
New trade debt/ 
Total sources 
41.3 (39.2)  23.4 (15.0)  45.8 (40.3)  19.4 (14.1)  41.3 (39.2)  45.8 (40.3)  23.4 (15.0)  19.4 (14.1) 
T test p value   0.000  0.000  0.466  0.065 
No. of observations   2,883   8,089  650   3,906  2,883  650  8.089  3,906 
The sample is made up of firms answering the SMF Survey 1998 2000 and having corresponding balance sheets in the CADS 1993 
2000; observations belonging to the 1
st and the 99
th percentiles are dropped. T test for equal means in the two sub groups are under the 
assumption of unequal variances. Financial ratios based on total sources are first averaged by firm and then over firms. A firm is 
classified as small if it has 20 employees or less; innovative firms declare they are innovative and have a share of sales that can be 
imputed to new products. 
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Table 3  
  INVESTMENTS AND CASH FLOW BY FIRM INNOVATIVE ATTITUDE AND SIZE  
(mean and median values over 1993 2000, ratios are in percentage) 
 
  Non innovative firms   Innovative firms            Small firms   Large firms 
  by size   by size   by innovative attitude   by innovative attitude   
  Small  Large  Small  Large   Non  
innovative 
Innovative    Non  
innovative 
Innovative   
             
Physical Investment 
/capital (t-1) 
27.0 (13.4)  20.9 (12.7)  31.0 (16.1)  21.5 (14.0)  27.0 (13.4)  31.0 (16.1)  20.9 (12.7)   21.5 (14.0) 
T test p value   0.000  0.010  0.105  0.373 
Cash flow/capital  
(t-1) 
46.0 (23.8)  32.9 (21.0)  66.1 (35.6)  34.7 (23.1)  46.0 (23.8)  66.1 (35.6)  32.9 (21.0)  34.7 (23.1)  
T test p value   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.069 
Cash flow-Inv/capital 
(t-1) 
16.6 (7.1)  10.8 (6.7)  31.1 (16.6)  12.0 (7.5)  16.6 (7.1)  31.1 (16.6)  10.8 (6.7)  12.0 (7.5) 
T test p value   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.177 
R&D expenditures 
/capital (t-1) (4) 
14.8 (4.1)  6.2 (2.4)  24.5 (7.0)  9.2 (3.5)  14.8 (4.1)  24.5 (7.0)  6.2 (2.4)  9.2 (3.5) 
T test p value   0.000  0.000  0.024  0.000 
Cash flow-R&D 
-Inv/capital (t-1) 
4.8 (2.1)  2.4 (2.7)   9.7 ( 0.3)  2.5 (2.2)  4.8 (2.1)   9.7 ( 0.3)  2.4 (2.7)  2.5 (2.2) 
T test p value   0.566  0.113  0.091  0.982 
Tangible assets/total 
assets  
18.3 (15.3)   22.8 (21.0)  16.9 (11.6)  22.1 (20.2)  18.3 (15.3)  16.9 (11.6)  22.8 (20.9)  22.1 (20.2) 
T test p value   0.000  0.000  0.036  0.010 
Intangible 
assets/fixed assets  
9.3 (2.5)   8.3 (2.8)  12.6 (4.5)  8.7 (3.4)  9.3 (2.5)  12.6 (4.5)  8.3 (2.8)  8.7 (3.4) 
T test p value   0.001  0.000  0.000  0.150 
No. of observations 
for cash flow  
1,472   5,520  346   2,811  1,472  346  5,520  2,811 
No. of observations 
for cash flow & R&D  
135  983  95  894  135  95  983  894 
No. of observations  2,883   8,089  650   3,906  2,883  650  8.089  3,906 
The sample is made up of firms answering the SMF Survey 1998 2000 and having corresponding balance sheets in the CADS 1993 
2000; observations belonging to the 1
st and the 99
th percentiles are dropped. T test for equal means in the two sub groups are under the 
assumption of unequal variances. R&D expenditures refer only to the period 1998 2000 and only to firms having R&D, i.e. they are 
missing for other firms. A firm is classified as small if it has 20 employees or less. Innovative firms declare they are innovative and have 
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   All firms   Small firms   Large firms     All firms   Small firms   Large firms  
             
Innovative firm 
(dummy)  
0.044 (3.52)   0.102 ( 5.17)  0.027 (2.64)    0.061 (1.17)  0.248 (1.79)  0.022 (0.40) 
               
Size (t 1)  0.000 (2.92)  0.013 (9.05)  0.000 ( 0.39)     0.000 ( 0.41)  0.009 (0.62)   0.000 ( 0.51) 
Tangible/tot. assets (t 1)  0.105 (4.65)   0.014 ( 0.26)  0.126 (4.90)    0.740 (4.21)  1.167 (2.90)  0.628 (3.13) 
Age (t 1)   0.000 ( 2.46)   0.000 ( 1.62)   0.000 ( 5.68)    0.001 (0.63)  0.002 (0.50)  0.001 (0.38) 
Profits (t 1)   0.422 ( 14.4)   0.330 ( 3.69)   0.449( 15.1)    1.784 (5.02)  1.650 (1.92)  1.775 (4.52) 
Firm in group (dummy)  0.036 (2.37)   0.094 ( 3.83)  0.045 (4.06)    0.049 (0.93)  0.081 (0.52)  0.039 (0.68) 
Centre    0.008 ( 0.48)  0.053 (2.24)  0.031 (1.72)     0.197 ( 3.08)   0.192 ( 1.36)   0.198 ( 2.75) 
South    0.123 ( 9.27)  0.009 (0.32)   0.113 ( 4.45)     0.148 ( 1.89)   0.195 ( 1.08)   0.157 ( 1.80) 
               
               
Breusch Pagan LM test 
panel variance=0 (p 
value)  
0.000  0.000  0.000         
2 R  between           0.04  0.08  0.04 
No. observations   12,223  2,461  9,762    12,105  2,424  9,681 
No. firms   2,189  525  1,664    2,153  511  1,642 
No. uncensored obs.   10,885  1,850  9,035         
No. of censored obs.  1,338  611  727         
Period   1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000    1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000 
The sample is made up of firms answering the SMF Survey 1998 2000 and having corresponding balance sheets in the CADS. 
The dependent variable is marked at the head of the column; test t are in parentheses. All the estimations contain time and 
industry dummies; one period lagged explanatory variables are used. A firm is classified as small if it has 20 employees or less. 
Innovative firms declare they are innovative and have a share of sales that can be imputed to new products. Size is the number of 
employees. Profits is the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (Return on assets). See the Appendix for 
further details on the variables used in the estimation.     28 
 
Table 4b 
SELECTED FINANCIAL INDICATORS:  
ESTIMATIONS BY FIRM INNOVATIVE ATTITUDE AND SIZE 
 
             




































             
  All firms   Small firms   Large firms   All firms   Small firms   Large firms  
         
Innovative firm (dummy)   0.033 (0.86)  0.088 (0.84)   0.004 ( 0.10)  0.002 (0.10)  0.061 (1.88)   0.021 ( 1.18) 
             
Size (t 1)  0.000 (5.61)   0.013 ( 1.83)  0.000 (5.60)  0.000 (4.29)  0.002 (1.02)  0.000 (4.28) 
Tangible/tot. assets (t 1)        0.072 (3.05)  0.141 (1.52)  0.062 (2.29) 
Age (t 1)         0.000 ( 1.53)   0.001 ( 1.36)   0.000 ( 1.33) 
Profits  (t 1)   2.782 ( 9.75)   2.536 ( 2.97)   2.877 ( 9.52)   1.120 ( 9.03)  0.106 (0.67)   1.150 ( 8.68) 
Firm in group (dummy)  0.207 (5.37)  0.199 (1.79)  0.182 (4.35)  0.094 (5.55)  0.073 (1.89)  0.080 (4.44) 
Centre   0.081 (1.72)  0.232 (2.44)  0.045 (0.83)  0.007 (0.34)   0.078 ( 2.50)   0.063 ( 0.27) 
South   0.369 (6.67)  0.499 (3.95)  0.324 (5.16)  0.143 (6.03)  0.007 (0.19)  0.122 (4.67) 
             
              
Wald test ρ=0 –pvalue   0.00  0.16  0.00  0.00  0.16  0.00 
No. observations   12,457  2,645  9,812  12,457  2,645  9,812 
No. uncensored obs.   1,930  320  1,610  1,930  320  1,610 
No. of censored obs.  10,527  2,325  8,202  10,527  2,325  8,202 
Period  1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000 
The sample is made up of firms answering the SMF Survey 1998 2000 and having corresponding balance sheets in the CADS. The 
dependent variable is marked at the head of the column; test t are in parentheses. All the estimations contain time and industry 
dummies; one period lagged explanatory variables are used. The Wald test is a test for the null that the correlation of the errors in 
the probability and in the main equation is zero. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedaticity and clustered at firm level. A firm is 
classified as small if it has 20 employees or less. Innovative firms declare they are innovative and have a share of sales that can be 
imputed to new products. Size is the number of employees. Profits is the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes to total 
assets (Return on assets). See the Appendix for further details on the variables used in the estimation. 
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Table 5 
INVESTMENT SENSITIVITY TO CASH FLOW BY FIRM  
INNOVATIVE ATTITUDE AND SIZE 
(System GMM estimation) 
 
             
  Innovative 
firms 
Innovative 
firms & size 
Innovative 
firms & size 
R&D  
Innovative 
firms & size 
Innovative 
firms & size 
Innovative 
Firms & size 
   (1)   (2)  (3)   (4)   (5)  (6) 
           
CF(t)/capital (t 1)  0.192 (1.90)           
CF(t)/capital (t 1)*Inno   0.157 ( 1.96)           
CF(t)/capital (t 1)*d1    0.014 (0.10)  0.163 (1.50)   0.013 ( 0.61)   0.061 ( 0.36)  0.144 (1.56) 
CF(t)/capital (t 1)*d2    0.082 (1.66)   0.063 ( 0.54)  0.040 (1.76)  0.064 (1.30)  0.135 (3.85) 
CF(t)/capital (t 1)*d3          0.081 (0.55)  0.488 (3.35) 
CF(t)/capital (t 1)*d4    0.150 (1.62)  0.249 (1.92)   0.007 ( 0.29)  0.132 (1.35)  0.239 (3.27) 
CF(t)/capital (t 1)*d5    0.454 (2.70)  0.176 (1.25)   0.007 ( 0.51)  0.418 (2.50)  0.411 (4.42) 
CF(t)/capital (t 1)*d6          0.086 (0.86)  0.341 (2.80) 
             
Inv.(t 1)/capital (t 2)   0.094 (3.83)  0.102 (4.33)  0.088 (2.39)    0.098 (4.07)  0.102 (4.65) 
R&D(t 1)/capital (t 2)        0.678 (12.7)     
Growth rate of sales(t)    0.125 ( 0.80)   0.072 ( 0.38)  0.155 (0.93)   0.017 ( 0.41)   0.059 ( 0.35)  0.006 (0.04) 
Growth rate of sales(t 1)  0.034 (1.04)  0.026 (0.75)  0.065 (1.85)  0.007 (0.67)  0.039 (1.10)  0.010 (0.34) 
Error correction term    0.027 ( 1.77)   0.017 ( 1.00)   0.031 ( 1.94)   0.001 ( 0.36)   0.022 ( 1.45)   0.001 ( 0.11) 
Sales (t 2)   0.004 ( 1.47)   0.000 ( 0.05)   0.010 ( 2.14)   0.000 ( 0.66)  0.000 (0.06)  0.003 (0.47) 
             
Tests             
CFd1=CFd4  p value    0.247  0.184  0.611  0.009  0.241 
CFd2=CFd5  p value     0.010  0.061  0.071  0.016  0.001 
CFd3=CFd6  p value          0.975  0.397 
CFd1=CFd2  p value    0.591  0.034  0.006  0.400  0.909 
CFd1=CFd3  p value          0.300  0.023 
CFd2=CFd3  p value          0.897  0.011 
             
Hansen p value   0.978  0.917  0.946  0.237  0.854  0.522 
Test for AR(1) in first 
difference p value 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.000 
Test for AR(2) in first 
difference p value 
0.664  0.533  0.825  0.472  0.625  0.361 
No. observations   4,640  4,640  1,995  2,020  4,640  4,640 
Observation per firms   5  5  5  5  5  5 
No.firms   928  928  399  404  928  928 
Period   1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000 
The sample is made up of firms answering to the SMF Survey 1998 2000 and having corresponding balance sheets in the 
CADS for 1993 2000. The dependent variable is the investment ratio, Investment (t)/Capital (t 1), excluding model 4 where 
R&D  investments  are  considered.  Constant,  time,  industries  and  area  dummies  are  included  in  the  estimation.  Inno  is  a 
dummy=1 for innovative firms. d1 is a dummy=1 for large innovative firms; d2=1 for small innovative; d3=1 for medium 
innovative; d4=1 for large non innovative; d5=1 for small non innovative; d6=1 for medium non innovative. Estimation is 
one step system GMM using Stata user written command xtabond2 by David Roodman. Asymptotically robust standard errors 
are used for t test reported in brackets. Hansen is a test of over identifying restrictions. Tests for AR(1) and AR(2) are for the 
presence of 1
st order and 2
nd order serial correlation in the first difference residuals. The instruments are Investment(t 2)/capital 
(t 3) and  Investment(t 3)/capital (t 4); growth rate of sales (t 2) and (t 3); CF(t 2)/capital(t 3) and CF(t 3)/capital(t 4) in the 
difference equations; for the level equations the first difference dated t 1 and t 2 are used as instruments. Models 1 to 6 are 
described in the text.       30 
Table 6 
 
          INVESTMENT SENSITIVITY TO CASH FLOW:  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
(System GMM estimation) 
 
           
  Innovative 
firms & size 
Innovative 
firms & size 
Innovative 
firms & size 
Innovative 
firms & size 
Innovative 
firms & size 
   (1)   (2)   (3)  (4)   (5)  
         
CF(t)/capital (t 1)*d1  0.324 (1.44)  0.067 (0.42)  0.081 (0.76)  0.023 (0.13)   0.008 ( 0.04) 
CF(t)/capital (t 1)*d2  0.202 (1.62)  0.050 (0.93)  0.006 (0.10)  0.083 (1.50)  0.026 (0.38) 
CF(t)/capital (t 1)*d4  0.227 (1.38)  0.174 (2.06)  0.171 (2.24)  0.159 (1.44)  0.083 (0.78) 
CF(t)/capital (t 1)*d5  0.508 (1.40)  0.390 (2.46)  0.372 (3.59)  0.440 (2.47)  0.446 (2.79) 
           
           
Inv.(t 1)/capital (t 2)   0.118 (2.77)  0.077 (3.02)  0.087 (3.62)  0.094 (4.05)  0.097 (4.18) 
Growth rate of sales(t)    0.012 ( 0.10)  0.009 (0.05)   0.053 ( 0.24)   0.113 ( 0.67)   0.067 ( 0.40) 
Growth rate of sales(t 1)   0.003 ( 0.04)  0.016 (0.41)  0.034 (0.91)  0.013 (0.33)  0.034 (0.84) 
Error correction term   0.013 (0.33)   0.025 ( 1.70)   0.017 ( 1.19)   0.016 ( 0.85)   0.024 ( 1.27) 
Sales (t 2)   0.005 ( 0.90)   0.002 ( 0.53)   0.003 ( 0.67)   0.002 ( 0.29)  0.001 (0.25) 
           
Test            
CFd1=CFd4  p value  0.504  0.477  0.296  0.319  0.447 
CFd2=CFd5  p value   0.378  0.014  0.000  0.017  0.003 
CFd1=CFd2  p value  0.573  0.901  0.409  0.694  0.829 
           
           
Hansen p value   0.989  0.519  0.722  0.971  0.938 
Test for AR(1) in first 
difference p value 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Test for AR(2) in first 
difference p value 
0.593  0.554  0.983  0.661  0.636 
No. observations   1,514  3,126  4,655  4,190  4,640 
Observation per firms   5  5  5  5  5 
No.firms   307  632  931  838  928 
Period   1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000  1993 2000 
The same footnote as in Table 5 applies. (1) Including only firms in high tech sectors; (2) including only 
firms in non high tech sectors;  (3) using another definition of cash flow drawn from balance sheet rather 
than from flows of funds accounts; (4) excluding firms with more than 500 employees; (5) allowing firms to 
enter/exit the classification of size.      31 
Appendix  
The variables used  
Equity: capital and reserves. Source CADS. 
Financial debts: bank and other financial debts. Source CADS. 
Leverage: financial debts/(financial debts plus equity). Source CADS. 
Short term financial debts: financial debts expiring in less than 1 year. Source CADS. 
Size: the number of firms’ employees. If this number is missing, we estimate it using 
labour costs and average labour cost per head in the firm industry (four digit figures). Source 
CADS. 
Tangible assets: net equipment and gross plants. Intangible assets: immaterial assets. 
Fixed assets: the sum of tangible and intangible assets. Source CADS 
Age: the age of the firm, equal to the difference between the year to which the data refer 
and the date of birth. Source CADS. 
Profits: the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (Return on 
assets). We use earnings before interest in order to have a profitability indicator that is the least 
influenced by financial indicators. Source CADS. 
Firm in a group (dummy): the dummy is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to group. Source: 
SMF 
Innovation firm (dummy): the dummy is equal to 1 if the firm declares it innovates and 
has a share of sales of new products greater than zero. Source: SMF 
R&D  expenditures:  as  in  other  countries,  this  item  is  normally  not  capitalised  under 
Italian accounting rules. We obtain R&D expenditures from the SMF survey as in the CADS 
often R&D is equal to zero for the same firm because they are included in other more general 
item. They are deflated (1995 prices) by an industrial (2 digit) price index for the value added. 
Source: SMF     32 
Physical investments: this  item  is  directly  drawn  from  the  flow  of  funds  data in  the 
CADS.  They are deflated using a sector (2 digit) price index for investments (1995 prices). 
Source CADS. 
Cash flow: this variable (net profits plus depreciation allowances) is directly drawn from 
the flow of funds data in the CADS. They are deflated using a sector (2 digit) price index for 
the value added (1995 prices). Source CADS. 
Sales: net sales in the CADS. They are deflated using a sector (2 digit) price index for the 
value added (1995 prices).  
Capital stock: the value of the net capital stock (property, plant and equipment) is taken 
from the CADS and is measured at replacement value the first year the observation is available. 
Specifically, in the first year, the book value of capital is expressed at the price of that year, 
using an estimation of the average age of the firm’s capital (life). This is computed using the 
sector useful life of capital (slife) and the share of goods already depreciated in the first year. 
The formula is:  
5 . 0 * ) / ( * 0 , 0 , t i k t i K p DEPR slife life =   
and  it  allows  for  the  fact  that  depreciation  for  tax  purposes  is  faster  than  economic 
depreciation; DEPR is equal to total book value accumulated depreciation. Subsequently, this 
first value of the capital is deflated, i.e. is expressed at 1995 prices. In this way, every amount 
is expressed at the prices of the same year. 
Then,  the  following  values  of  capital  are  calculated  using  the  perpetual  inventory 
method:  
t i t i t i I K K , 1 , , ) 1 ( + - = - d  
In  this  formula,  d  is  the  depreciation  rate,  assumed  equal  to  0.05,  and  t i I ,   are  the 
investments deflated at 1995 prices. 
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